Drone incursions over U.S. installations aren’t hypothetical anymore; they’re daily friction. NORAD’s boss told Congress this year that hundreds of incursions have been detected at U.S. military facilities—domestic and overseas—over a recent period, a drumbeat that finally forced a rethink in base defense.
Enter a new quick reaction force (QRF) concept for counter-UAS: flyaway teams built to move fast, plug into a base’s security stack, and start killing drones in minutes. The QRF idea sits alongside the Pentagon’s new interservice counter-drone task force under Army lead (Task Force/Joint Interagency Task Force “401”), which replaces the Joint C-sUAS Office and centralizes buying power, fielding, and TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) standardization.
What is Task Force 401?
Task Force 401, formally known as the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401), is a new U.S. Department of War initiative led by the Army, established to centralize and accelerate the development, acquisition, and deployment of counter-small unmanned aircraft systems (C-sUAS) technology. Task Force 401 replaces the previous Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) and is granted unprecedented authority, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of War.
It has acquisition and procurement authority, can manage research and development efforts with a budget approval of up to $50 million per counter-drone initiative, and coordinates forensics, exploitation, and replication efforts related to drone threats. The task force also aims to streamline and unify counter-drone capabilities across various agencies, potentially influencing federal-wide drone defense strategies, with a focus on rapidly outpacing evolving drone threats.
It has a planned “sunset review” after 36 months, underscoring its role as a focused, adaptive response to the escalating drone threat environment.
What the QRF Will Look Like
Think of small, modular teams—security forces, EW specialists, and sensor techs—traveling with a carry-on armory: compact multi-spectral radars, RF detection kits, EO/IR cameras, and laptop-based C2 (command and control). They arrive, tie into on-site sensors, lay out passive RF antennas on rooftops, and stand up a layered kill chain: detect → identify → decide → defeat. Reporting indicates these teams are meant to rush to any base taking drone pressure and bring both brains and hardware to restore airspace control.
On the command-and-control side, the QRF slots into the new task force’s doctrine and data standards so a base commander isn’t juggling four screens and a prayer.
The goal is one fused picture, one authority to pull the trigger, and a clear menu of options from soft-kill to hard-kill.
That approach mirrors the Pentagon’s recent strategy push to integrate counter-drone measures into organization, training, and policy—not bolt-ons, but core muscle.
Is Anduril in the Mix?
Yes—at least for the Marine Corps. In March, the Marines awarded Anduril a $642 million contract to deliver, install, and sustain a family of systems to protect Marine installations from small drones. Anduril advertises an end-to-end counter-UAS stack (Lattice AI C2, sensors, and interceptors) designed to run the full kill chain. While service-by-service configurations will vary, Anduril gear is already part of the U.S. base-defense reality and will almost certainly appear in QRF loadouts where the Marines are stakeholders or where joint forces standardize around common C2.
How the Kill Chain Works (Defensive to Offensive)
Detection & Tracking (Defensive Layer 1):
Portable radars and passive RF sensors cue EO/IR cameras to classify tracks. The fused picture flags tell-tale signatures: control-link frequencies, GPS behavior, flight profiles. This is about fast, low-collateral awareness in busy airspace—exactly what senior leaders say is needed around American communities.
Electronic Warfare (Defensive Layer 2):
When collateral risk is high, the first shot is invisible: RF defeat. Handheld or tripod systems sever the control link or blind the drone’s navigation so it drifts to a safe crash zone. NORTHCOM’s updated procedures emphasize tools like these for ambiguous, “mystery drone” events where attribution and safety are front and center.
Directed Energy (Defensive Layer 3):
Lasers and emerging high-power microwave options give base defenders magazine depth without supply trucks. Lasers burn sensors or airframes; microwaves fry swarms in a single pulse. Fielding is uneven but accelerating across services and partners.
Kinetic Interceptors (Offensive Layer):
When it’s time to swat, the U.S. toolkit includes Coyote interceptors, which have notched well over a hundred real-world kills, plus guns and proximity-fuzed rounds inside safe backstops. Expect QRF kits to carry interceptors for one-way attack drones that ignore jamming and keep coming.
Active Pursuit (Offensive Layer, Mobile):
Some forces will deploy autonomous intercept drones to chase and collide or net hostile UAS, guided by AI C2 that fuses all those sensors. Vendors (including Anduril) market this as a single interface from detection to defeat, a model the services are gravitating toward for speed and simplicity under stress.
How We Got Here—and What’s Next
Congress nudged this along in the FY25 NDAA with deadlines and reporting on base protection, while the Pentagon built the organizational plumbing to move faster and buy smarter. RAND’s recent tabletop with 100+ participants from 24+ agencies stress-tested exactly the sort of interagency/base-defense scenarios the QRF is geared to handle. The direction of travel is clear: standardize, centralize, and sprint.
Bottom line
The QRF is the muscle car you keep idling at the curb—gassed, loud, and ready to rip—so the next time a swarm shows up over a flight line or weapons storage area, someone owns the sky in minutes, not hours.