Two of the world’s most powerful men meet on the edge of the map today. As I write this, they are meeting in Anchorage, where Russia sits just over the horizon. They are there to talk about Ukraine, but if there’s a place to restart talks on nuclear arms control, the American Arctic is a fitting table. The stakes are not abstract: Washington and Moscow still field the world’s only full nuclear triads, and New START, the last treaty capping their deployed strategic forces, expires in February 2026. The Alaska summit gives them a clean shot to stop the slide.
Where the Arsenal Sits Right Now
Let’s start with the numbers. As of January 2025, SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) estimates the United States has a total inventory of 5,177 nuclear warheads, of which about 3,700 are in the military stockpile (usable) and roughly 1,770 are deployed—on ICBMs, ballistic-missile submarines, or at bomber bases. The United States retains about 200 non-strategic (tactical) B61 bombs, including ~100 forward-deployed across six bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye.
Russia’s total inventory sits around 5,459 warheads, with approximately 4,309 in the stockpile. Of those, about 1,718 are deployed strategic warheads, and an estimated 1,477 are non-strategic—a category that drives NATO planners up the wall because it includes a wide mix of dual-capable systems. Russia has also dispersed bombers during the Ukraine war to bases like Olenya and Belaya after Ukrainian drone strikes—a reminder that survivability games are back.
How We Got Here: From SALT to Thin Ice
The Cold War playbook worked: START I (1991) capped launchers and warheads at leviathan levels (1,600 delivery vehicles; 6,000 accountable warheads), then SORT/Moscow Treaty (2002) pushed operationally deployed warheads to 1,700–2,200. New START (2010; extended to Feb. 4, 2026) tightened the screws—1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed launchers—with inspections and data exchanges that kept both sides honest. The wheels started to wobble after the INF Treaty died in 2019 and Russia suspended New START participation in 2023, freezing inspections.
What an Alaska Breakthrough Could Look Like
Freeze and verify, fast. Both sides can publicly reaffirm adherence to New START’s 1,550/700 limits through 2026 and sign a short verification reboot: quarterly data exchanges, remote inspections, or managed access at a minimal number of sites, and a hotline for notifications. That buys time and confidence while the lawyers grind on a bigger deal.
Park the tactical wildcards. The next fight isn’t only ICBMs and SLBMs—it’s non-strategic nukes. A narrow transparency package could start with reciprocal declarations of total non-strategic stockpiles and storage bases, followed by on-site visits to a small, agreed set of bunkers. It’s modest, but it cracks the door on the hardest class of weapons—particularly relevant as NATO hosts B61-12s and Russia talks up deployments near Belarus.
An “INF-lite” restraint. Neither side will resurrect the 1987 treaty wholesale, but they can pledge no land-based nuclear-armed missiles between 500–5,500 km in Europe and the Arctic, paired with mutual observation of tests. Call it a geographic cordon—simple to message, useful for commanders from Norfolk to Murmansk.
Bring the exotics into the tent. Fold systems like Avangard and other novel delivery vehicles into counting rules (each launcher counts as one; deployed payloads count toward warhead totals). This avoids Washington and Moscow talking past each other on what exactly is “strategic” in 2025.
Tie it to the clock. Set a 180-day deadline for a follow-on “New START-Plus” framework that keeps the old deployed caps, adds non-strategic transparency, and modernizes verification for the Sentinel/B-21/Columbia era and Russia’s updated triad. If the clock runs out, both sides commit to extending the interim measures for another year while talks continue.
Why You Should Care
Arms control isn’t kumbaya—it’s operational clarity. When both sides trade data and let inspectors count launchers, planners can right-size alert postures, reduce false alarms, and free up ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) for real problems. In Europe, where American aircrews sit on B61-12 tasking and Russian regiments train dual-capable, verified limits mean fewer chances for a bad day to spin worse. And in the Arctic—where submarines play hide-and-seek and bombers probe each other’s ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone)—predictability is a force multiplier.
Bottom line
Alaska won’t solve Ukraine, rebuild trust, or erase a decade of treaty wreckage. But it can start something measurable: keep New START’s limits alive while bolting on fresh verification, put the first numbers on tactical nukes, and stake out no-go zones for new land-based missiles in Europe.
If both leaders walk away with those three markers, the deterrence equation gets saner—and the rest of us sleep a bit easier under the nuclear triad’s shadow.