Editor’s Note: Welcome back to our weekly column with former Green Beret Curtis Fox, where we explore the evolving role of Special Forces. This week, Fox discusses a proposal to restructure the Special Forces company (SFOD-B) by reducing administrative burdens on operational teams, incorporating more specialized and smaller units, and prioritizing training and leadership development to enhance efficiency and retention within the Regiment.
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The traditional Special Forces company includes six-line Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFOD-As). The company HQ (SFOD-B) includes a Major (CO), Captain (XO), Sergeant Major, CW3 Warrant Officer, Team Sergeant (18Z), and 6 NCO staff billets. The SFOD-B is designed to deliver command and control and support to a special forces company, enabling the independent maneuver of six SFOD-As and their partner forces.
If we carry forward our thinking on meeting the Special Forces Regiment’s mission requirements through smaller and more specialized units, then there may only be a need for three traditional SFOD-As, one six-man team, and two three-man teams per company. Each traditional SFOD-A would remain under the command of a Captain. The six-man team and three-man teams would be commanded by a senior Captain (who has already deployed with an SFOD-A once) or by a Warrant Officer.
The SFOD-B HQ would remain under the command of a Major, with a Captain (XO), Sergeant Major, and CW3 in his command team entourage. However, while the company Ops Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) needs to remain an 18Z, the staff billets do not need to be filled by Special Forces qualified NCOs, but by administrative support specialists that can double as an Airborne qualified infantry squad. Support staff billets also need to be increased from 6 to 15 in order to remove the enormous administrative load off of the SFOD-As.
SFOD-B staff should include an ammunition manager, property book manager, company credit card manager, motor pool coordinator, training range coordinator, travel specialist, parachute training coordinator, jump log custodian, training calendar custodian, military driver’s license manager, demolitions and explosives manager, equipment acquisitions manager, OPFOR coordinator, and other support functions as they become apparent. These are all jobs that can be tasked to smart Airborne qualified 11Bs (infantrymen).
And as stated earlier, it may also be useful to consider locating general staff sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5, S-6) at the company level as well. This would remove administrative loads off of the SFOD-A, and closer proximity to the line teams would better inform tailored support for the mission than battalion HQs can provide.
The unfortunate fact is that the SFOD-B is often the last element to receive full manning because Special Forces Sergeant Majors naturally prioritize staffing the line teams with new graduates from the Q-Course first. However, because the SFOD-B is chronically under-staffed, an enormous amount of time is spent by Green Berets squaring away administrative problems from the team room.
USASOC (US Army Special Operations Command) staff have wrestled with removing the 18 series staffing requirements for the SFOD-B several times. The argument against change is simple: SFOD-B personnel must be Special Forces Qualified in order to deploy with the line teams into hostile or denied environments, likely disconnected from higher support. In reality, when an SFOD-A requires support downrange, the SFOD-B may send some its HQ personnel forward in a surge capacity to support and assist. There’s no reason a fire team or squad of Airborne infantrymen, under the leadership of the Company Ops Sergeant (18Z), couldn’t cover these tasks.
USASOC’s hand-wringing is based largely on theoretical concerns. At no time since 1952 has an SFOD-B parachuted with the rest of its company into a Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaign, completely isolated from higher support, to coordinate the SFOD-As as they run guerilla forces and underground components of a resistance movement. That is not how the SFOD-B has been employed in practice, and USASOC’s argument ignores the hard-won combat experiences of the Regiment.
Resolving administrative issues at the SFOD-B would reduce garrison fatigue and frustration, and would ensure that the company’s teams and personnel can all focus on what is most important—TRAINING. Reducing these garrison frustrations would almost certainly assist the Special Forces Regiment with its retention problems.
USASOC also needs to ensure that there is a weekly ammo allotment available not only for SFOD-As, but for individual Green Berets. Some of the best company and battalion commanders in the Regiment preach that their guys should be on a flat range working through the piano-scales of tactical marksmanship at least once a week. Green Berets should also be able to come into the office early, take a working lunch, or stay late in order to better hone their trigger fingers.
Company Sergeant Majors need to coordinate weekly training for their young NCOs. E-5 and E-6 Green Berets, especially the 18Xs (those that entered the Special Forces Qualification Course without experience in the conventional Army), need continuing tactical leadership development. Company Sergeant Majors can reach out to main post units for platoons that are interested in training in small unit tactics (SUT) and close-quarters battle (CQB) with Special Forces junior NCOs. Conventional Army units and local National Guard can volunteer personnel to participate in training patrols with young Green Berets role-playing as platoon leaders. The actual NCOs of these platoons can grade the performance of these young Green Berets and report to the company Sergeant Major.
A sharp Special Forces battalion commander once explained to me that he directed his Captains (SFOD-A commanders) to square away admin problems and do paperwork on Monday. Tuesday and Wednesday were days to train the team in shoot-maneuver-communicate. On Thursday, teams were on the flat range, getting trigger time. On Friday, teams did vehicle maintenance, cleaned guns, and went home after lunch. That was his definition of a proper week in garrison. There’s no reason this shouldn’t be a Regimental standard.
The administrative requirements placed on SFOD-As by their respective battalions and Groups constrain the 18A’s participation in day-to-day informal training. Officers need to rehearse tactical comms, flat range marksmanship, charge construction, breaching, and every other SOF skill just like their NCOs.
I’ve never known an 18A who didn’t bust his ass to meet all of the requirements placed on him. Unfortunately, senior leaders in the Regiment tend to place unreasonable expectations on young Captains. When complaints make their way up to battalion or group, young officers are too often told, “I made it work when I was on a team.”
If the admin load is preventing an 18A from leaving the team room, then the admin load is the problem. USASOC is long overdue for a systematic review of the administrative obligations placed on an 18A’s time and on the SFOD-A’s training calendar.
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Stay tuned for next week’s continuation of “Practice of Unconventional Warfare,” where Fox challenges the Army’s career path for Special Forces, proposing reforms to better develop officers, retain NCOs, and enhance mission effectiveness.
You can read the previous column here.