Editor’s Note: Today’s “Bolduc Brief” was co-authored by Donald C. Bolduc and Chris Hensley – GDM
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001 to conduct unconventional warfare to topple the Taliban regime. The fall of the Taliban and the establishment of a new Afghan government in December 2001, the SOF campaign quickly transitioned from unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense and contingency operations employing irregular Afghan security forces to improve the security situation. Security forces are considered “irregular” when they do not fall within the formal security establishment, even if sanctioned and supported by the state. They are more of a militia as opposed to a standing and professional police or military force.[1] The fall of the Taliban left a security void and the coalition and new Afghan government determined they had to build Afghan’s security apparatus from scratch. As a result, they often had to rely on irregular security forces to provide security in the more remote areas of the rugged country.
Unfortunately, multiple attempts to create these irregular security forces prior to 2009 largely ended in failure. But these earlier experiences slowly revealed the costs, benefits, and risks associated with irregular force constructs. Lessons learned from earlier attempts—along with support from academics, innovative SOF non-commissioned officers company grade, field grade leadership, and geopolitical conditions—coalesced during 2009-2013 to enable the development and application of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and supporting Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs, the first truly successful irregular security force. It was a balanced “bottom up and top down” counterinsurgency approach, with the objective of connecting traditional tribal governance at the village level to the central government at the district and provincial levels.
Key to this objective was empowering rural populations to govern and defend themselves on a day-to-day basis, while stabilizing and improving the basic functions of district governance. The approach was unique in that it attempted to integrate security, development, and governance through a balanced, mutually supportive method that would address the underlying sources of instability in rural Afghanistan. The VSO/ALP construct may not be a panacea for all security and stability issues, but this chapter presents it as an effective construct in Afghanistan.
The chapter highlights the evolution of the irregular force construct in selected areas of Afghanistan in hopes that the lessons learned may prove valuable when considering irregular force employment in similar environments. It starts with an overview of irregular forces. Next it discusses some of the implications of a parochial-based security force design. It then describes some of the earlier irregular security forces: Afghan security forces, Afghan highway patrolmen, Afghan National Auxiliary Police, Afghan Public Protection Program. It then details the development of the Village Stability Operations program and the Afghan Local Police.
Irregular Force Overview
Some of the most iconic images of irregular forces are those of SOF and Northern Alliance fighters galloping on horseback toward Taliban tanks in Afghanistan in 2001.[2] This marked only the beginning of SOF experiences with irregular force employment in Afghanistan. There were multiple attempts over the years to apply irregular force solutions to persistent operational gaps and shortfalls. Unfortunately, all but one of these approaches failed. It is important to understand these failures and, conversely, to examine why VSO/ALP succeeded.
A number of factors contributed to recurring irregular force program failures: application of a security architecture that failed to consider Afghan culture and social paradigms, parochial U.S. and Afghan leadership, competing U.S. national security priorities, lack of a dominant governing campaign strategy, and a widespread ignorance of Afghanistan’s history and its related social and cultural dynamics.
From 2002-2010, SOF attempted to address rural insecurity and instability through the integration of formal and informal Afghan security forces. The lack of success for this “integrated” approach resulted from two dynamics encountered by SOF: 1) Afghan national, provincial, and district governance dysfunction coupled with corruption; and 2) a rural population characterized by fierce independence and a historical pattern of fighting against the centralization of authority.
The only successful attempts at relative central authority in Afghanistan’s history are those that employed a “Swiss Cheese” model, coined by Thomas Barfield. He explained that successful rulers and their succeeding dynasties understood that only the most populated and economically prosperous segments of the country could be governed. All other geographically disconnected areas had to be left to their own tribal and clan forms of governance.[3]
Barfield described this type of polity as “Swiss Cheese” vs. “Processed American Cheese” where central authority is “universal and absolute.”[4] He explained that central authority was never historically extended to these distant and remote areas in Afghanistan unless they posed a direct challenge to the state. When they posed a challenge, successful rulers confronted these distant threats by empowering their rival clans and tribes, preventing their access to urban markets, or attacking these challengers to demonstrate the cost of their actions. All of the regimes that tried to govern these distant locals—Amanullah Khan from 1919-1929, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) from 1978-1992, and the Taliban from 1996-2001—were ultimately overthrown.[5]
Despite historical precedent for irregular force and governance approaches, each attempt by SOF to implement this strategy in Afghanistan met sharp criticism and resistance from the international community, the U.S. interagency in the US Military, and even Afghan central authority. When rebuilding the Afghan government, the international community decided to build a large, formal Western-style army and police force with little regard for Afghanistan’s historical, cultural, and polity paradigms. Both Afghan and coalition political representatives, as well as senior military leaders, viewed irregular forces as antithetical to the Western model of a stable democratic state. They were perceived as proxies for warlords or other malevolent actors and a potentially lethal threat to democracy. Critics mistakenly pointed to the rise of warlords after the Soviet withdrawal, which set conditions for the Taliban and their eventual takeover of Afghanistan.
The decision to develop Western-style security forces resulted in an overinvestment in Afghan security ministries and an underinvestment in non-security ministries, which limited the capacity of the Afghan government to address the root causes of rural instability. Most of the international community believed, and still do in large measure today, that only a central authority controlling a Western-style military and police force could improve security and stability in Afghanistan. This opinion, despite ample historical evidence to the contrary, remains a formidable obstacle.
Opposition to employment of irregular forces and the lack of a corresponding counterinsurgency strategy strangled attempts at pursuing “bottom-up” irregular force approaches. Some military units attempted to create local, irregular security forces, but these programs slowly deteriorated due to a lack of financial, material, or political support from the international community, the Afghan central government, and those in the military community who believed that a counterterrorism approach was the solution to Afghanistan’s problems. Unfortunately, this cycle would continue until 2009 before conditions were finally ripe for the successful application of an irregular force embracing a traditional governance approach.
Why did opinion change and the appetite for alternative approaches increase? It is possible that the years of operational stagnation became more obvious by 2009. The Afghan central government and the coalition were simply not winning decisively. Political and military leaders alike, especially President Barack Obama, sought new solutions.
In May 2009, President Obama relieved the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General David D. McKiernan, and appointed General Stanley McChrystal. He assumed command with a reputation as an innovative commander.[6] McChrystal’s leadership would drive significant changes in the coalition’s approach to securing Afghanistan. The climate became more receptive to alternative methods that reflected Afghanistan’s cultural and societal paradigms. Nevertheless, change would be slow in coming.
Implications of a Parochial-based Security Force Design
Following the defeat of the Taliban, Afghan stakeholders signed the Bonn Agreement authorizing state-building efforts by the international community.[7] It requested support building a security force but did not specify size or type. The international community decided upon a large, centralized Western military design intended to support a strong, democratically elected central government. Although well intended, this decision failed to fully appreciate the unique nature of Afghanistan’s polity, culture, and social structure. Moreover, the force was not designed to counter the Taliban’s rural-based insurgency. As a result, the operational performance of the newly created Afghan security forces was inadequate to deal with the re-emerging insurgent threat.
High attrition rates, an inability to logistically support operations, and inadequate command and control capacities plagued the Afghan National Army (ANA). New soldiers were stationed hundreds of miles from their ancestral and tribally affiliated communities. This removed the sense of clan and tribal obligation that otherwise would have existed, degrading operational performance, and increasing incidences of undesirable behavior with local populations, often offending the very people they were supposed to win over to demonstrate the new government’s legitimacy. Missing home, many ANA members would simply walk away or never return from leave, devastating operational readiness rates. Also damaging was the fact that many Afghan military leaders at the time had obtained their appointments through patronage or bribes of some form and sorely lacked any operational competency.
In addition, the development of the Afghan National Police was misguided; the coalition members built a Western-style police force focused on addressing criminal and civil threats, not a ruthless and well-armed insurgency. This training focus left the ANA and national police ill-prepared for the harsh realities awaiting them in rural areas of Afghanistan.
The ANA and national police’s developmental and operational limitations, combined with the re-emergence of the Taliban and other insurgent groups from 2003-2005, caused a division of coalition operational priorities. Emphasis began to shift toward countering insurgent threats (i.e., attacking the Taliban), which came at the expense of training the ANA and national police. The Western security model conflicted with social and cultural paradigms, thereby limiting the ANA and national police’s operational effectiveness. Additionally, the ANA and national police were not large enough to adequately address a rural-based and geographically dispersed insurgent threat.
As a result, the U.S. and coalition efforts to counter insurgent threats and train their partners simultaneously produced an operational methodology focused on short-duration combat operations with no ability or intent to retain key terrain. This led to a counterproductive cycle: coalition and ANA elements would clear an area, return to their bases, and then the Taliban would eventually reseed the previously cleared territory. U.S. and coalition military units would then rotate out of Afghanistan, and the incoming units would have to re-clear the same areas again.
The Afghans living in these rural areas recognized that neither the Afghan government nor the Taliban were winning, which resulted in “fence sitting” by a majority of the rural populace. Neutrality ensured their survival. Change was required, but few recognized it. The lack of an overarching counterinsurgency campaign strategy operational level assessment framework, plus the frequency of U.S. and coalition unit rotation, resulted in operational stalemate.
The absence of a comprehensive strategy and long-term vision inadvertently created a cycle of frustration: American units rotated into Afghanistan, observed the current situation, and formulated plans that would support their tactical priorities, at least for the duration of their stay. This produced objectives and end-states that were tactical and short-term: clear a particular geographic area of insurgents, improve a few tactical capacities of a partner, and sprinkle in civil-military development efforts.
Conventional forces would complete their respective rotation and either never return to Afghanistan or return many years later. This cycle prevented senior leaders from recognizing and altering the approach. Conversely, many SOF elements returned year after year. It was not uncommon for some SOF units and leaders to have completed as many as six or eight rotations. This rotational frequency helped reveal the lack of an effective counterinsurgency campaign strategy, assessment framework, and operational progress.
The Short-Lived Afghan Security Forces Program (2004-2005)
Repetitive rotations contributed to SOF efforts to develop relationships with their Afghan partners. These relationships informed decisions to align teams either with ANA partners—focusing solely on developing capacity—or against Taliban networks. This approach improved partner tactical capacity development and addressed threat mitigation. Teams operating unilaterally in 2003-2004 targeting the Taliban, however, recognized a need for Afghan forces to expand their combat power, protect outposts, and gather intelligence.
SOF began recruiting and employing irregular forces. Over time, these irregular forces became increasingly capable. By 2004, they were labeled Afghan Security Forces. SOF and Afghan Security Force elements effectively targeted and neutralized many insurgent fighters and facilitators. Unfortunately, the Afghan forces could not hold terrain, and coalition forces did not focus sufficient attention on the development of the Afghan Army. Compounding the challenge was the U.S. invasion of Iraq that made Afghanistan a supporting effort.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai and others in the Afghan government became increasingly outspoken about the president’s aversion to irregular forces, given the mujahidin warlord rule in the early to mid-1990s. The Afghan Security Forces, however, filled a critical operational need for Army Special Forces teams, especially in remote rural areas. The Special Forces teams developed trust and formed close bonds with their Afghan Security Forces partners by living, eating, laughing, and sharing with them, which translated into greater security and operational effectiveness. In time, however, SOF would increasingly be partnered with ANA and, in some instances, national police partners as their ranks expanded. Employment of the Afghan Security Forces would eventually be restricted to base security functions. By 2005, the Afghan Security Forces program had been largely disbanded.
As the ANA grew in size and capabilities, so did the Taliban. The predominant counterinsurgency approach continued to employ a combination of SOF short duration search-and-attack and precision direct action missions. Coalition outposts slowly spread across Afghanistan in an attempt to limit insurgent freedom of movement, protect LOCs, and target Taliban networks.
U.S. and coalition SOF targeted insurgent leaders and facilitators and attempted to operate in the seams and gaps where conventional forces were not arrayed. The United States and its partners slowly learned what had always been a constant in Afghanistan: security does not exist beyond the roads of major population centers. Central authorities had never truly been able to exercise control of Afghanistan. By 2005, U.S. and coalition SOF recognized this reality and began to attempt a different approach in these remote, untamed areas.
Experimenting with Tribal Security Architecture in Uruzgan Province
When Task Force-31 (TF-31), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Bolduc, returned to Kandahar in July 2005, commanding the battalion for two consecutive deployments between 2005-2007 with some of the battalions’ Special Forces teams were on their 4th and 5th rotation including deployments in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. A Special Forces battalion has three Special Forces companies, each with six detachments or teams, and a headquarters company. TF-31 would be assigned to Southern Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan.
Predictably, the men of the task force found themselves having to regain lost terrain secured just months earlier. Having participated in the capture of Kandahar and Karzai’s reintroduction to the country in 2001, Bolduc implicitly understood the critical role tribal alliances played in the effort then and what that meant now. Recognizing the weight of the task ahead for his unit, Bolduc encouraged his company and detachment commanders to leverage tribal structures during their rotation in the Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat Provinces. (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Uruzgan Province in Afghanistan
In this section we will focus the efforts the Uruzgan Province. After completing a 30-day area assessment, it was clear that tribal alliances and power brokers would prove instrumental; the 150 Texas National Guard, U.S. civil-military personnel, Australian special operations elements, and 200 ANA arrayed in Uruzgan would have to reorganize, unify, and synchronize efforts to improve security conditions. This would prove challenging as the command and control of these units we not organic to TF-31. Nonetheless, the leaders in these units figured out a way to complement each other’s efforts despite the lack of unity of effort of their respective higher headquarters.
The Uruzgan governor, Jan Mohammed, was a Karzai appointee who supported SOF’s entry into the country in 2001, but subsequently established a kleptocracy, severely alienating the provincial population. This only fed the Taliban’s narrative, enabling them to exponentially expand their influence and freedom of maneuver. Conditions were so adverse that coalition forces could not travel safely to the governor’s mansion a quarter of a mile from their outpost, local Afghan security guards hired by the provincial reconstruction team[8] were found diagraming the central coalition outpost, and special forces detachments were discovering similar circumstances miles away at their outposts as well. Recognizing that significant manpower would be required to alter these conditions, the task force commenced engagement with local officials and tribal leaders.
The company discovered that the governor’s right hand-man, Matiullah Khan—who was a member of the Pashtun subtribe known as the Popalzai—was the tribal leader of the province as well. The company immediately set out to harness this opportunity and began working directly with Khan. Each party recognized the potential of this relationship and their shared interests in improving security.
Replacing Governor Jan Mohammed—who was involved with corruption, narcotics, and duplicitous actions with the Taliban—was a requirement for establishing the legitimacy of the Afghan government and improving security in the province. The SOF relationship with Khan would be the decisive factor in marginalizing the governor and accomplishing this delicate task. The lesson emerging for SOF at the time was that we needed the right leaders to be chosen to achieve security and stability improvements. The decisions were not made lightly, but they were necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.
Khan, the illiterate son of a farmer who received his tribal appointment through heredity, maintained power by crushing challengers. Nevertheless, Khan was a product of the conditions and society around him. Khan had close ties to Karzai, who was also a member of the Popalzai subtribe. Khan had personally helped Karzai reach Kandahar in 2001. His relationship with Karzai and role as the provincial tribal leader ensured formal and informal governance connectivity. For these reasons, Khan was best positioned to help the United States achieve its objectives in Afghanistan.
Khan certainly recognized that a relationship with U.S. and coalition forces could render legitimacy, financial gain, and political power. His loyalties rapidly realigned with those of the coalition. Soon, he openly defied Governor Jan Mohammed’s requests that ran counter to SOF interests. He reported the governor’s attempts to discredit the coalition politically, or leak intelligence concerning SOF missions to the Taliban. Khan reported the governor’s trafficking in narcotics. Eventually, Karzai removed Governor Jan Mohammad from office in 2006.
While developing this relationship with Khan and the various Popalzai district elders, both U.S. and Australian SOF placed immense pressure on Taliban networks through top down and bottom up kinetic and non-kinetic operations to create the time and space necessary for these other relationships to solidify and to conduct partner and governance development efforts. Coalition and Afghan forces pushed the Taliban out of population centers and persistently targeted them in the surrounding countryside. This enabled Khan to establish rings of security checkpoints around Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan’s provincial capital.
As this Popalzai security force demonstrated an increased ability to maintain lines of communication[9] and local security, SOF sought approval from the Afghan central government to designate Khan and his men official Afghan highway patrolmen. Lessons from the short-lived Afghan Security Forces program drove the need to formalize this irregular force to ensure its long-term viability.
The highway patrolmen, an irregular security force created by Khan, also provided needed access and support from the local population. The highway patrolmen members were comprised of the families and clans in the area; in contrast, few, if any, of the ANA forces operating in the area were from the province. This improved situational awareness by allowing unfiltered insight into public sentiment and building trust between the Afghan government and the local population.
As a result of the combined pressure on Taliban networks and development of this nascent tribal force into a viable, formal Ministry of Interior entity, security conditions in Uruzgan improved. This enabled the provincial reconstruction team, led by Lieutenant Colonel Robin Fontes and State Department representative Dan Green, to more effectively execute their respective missions. Greater freedom of movement allowed the team to meet more frequently with government officials and local populations. The team even held a provincial-level women’s rights gathering, and Khan chased away a group of men who opposed the meeting—not with a moral obligation motive, but for self-interest and to protect his personal reputation, which is a significant component of Pashtun tribal society.
Khan and the highway patrolmen filled an important tactical gap: they provided a tribal-based means to secure and hold terrain and maintain civil order. Yet, the construct still presented challenges in Uruzgan’s western and most eastern corridors, given their distance from Khan’s reach.
Another shortfall revolved around economic developments. Some large-scale infrastructure projects occurred, but investment in micro-development was lacking. Bolduc had attempted to create village reconstruction teams to work hand-in-hand with the provincial reconstruction teams, but he lacked the time to implement before the battalion rotated out of Afghanistan.
Additionally, power struggles bubbled to the surface as Khan’s influence and stature grew. Smaller subtribes—the Barakzai and Alokazai—complained of being threatened, attacked, or mistreated by the Popalzai. Some friction was inevitable, however, and what Khan could not resolve could be addressed through the Ministry of Interior because they controlled the highway patrolmen’s purse strings.
The approach certainly had its faults, but traditional and formal governance began to intersect in central Uruzgan. The effort simply needed to be nurtured and codified. In the years to come, Khan and the highway patrolmen continued to support coalition SOF, fought side by side with them, and proved indispensable until a Taliban suicide bomber assassinated Khan in Kabul in 2015. The experiment also reinforced the theory that a counterinsurgency strategy that balances counterterrorism operations with formal and informal partner development efforts is optimally effective in setting conditions for partner operational independence. Unfortunately, given the lack of a governing long-term theater strategy, after TF-31 departed, its replacements reverted to a counterterrorism centric approach. This ultimately ceded terrain and popular influence back to the Taliban.
Members of TF-31 had grown so accustomed to this cycle of capturing and then later ceding terrain that they reluctantly accepted its inevitability; they would have to adjust to it when they returned in six months. Bolduc instructed Major Chris Wells and Major Jason McKenzie to integrate recent lessons learned into the TF-31’s future operational approach. It ultimately reflected that the Taliban would have to be pushed away from Kandahar and other population centers; the Afghan security architecture would need to integrate tribally-based security forces; the battalion would have to explore expanding partnerships with Afghan police; and holding key terrain provincially required a large-scale irregular force structure.
This would necessitate some adjustment of formal partnerships with the ANA, and partnership would be retained where operationally advantageous to maintain pressure on insurgents. In a series of briefings and informal discussions, Bolduc outlined the following expectations for each team member: Relying on professionalism and discipline of his teams he supported flat communications, decentralized authority, and a distributed tactical footprint. Success in counterinsurgency operations rests on two factors: (1) an appropriate top-down overarching strategy; and (2) a decentralized execution of that strategy. Each team’s ability to make sound and timely decisions independently served as a key factor in the rate and degree of progress. Having to constantly seek permission and guidance proved counterproductive.
Equally important was for detachments to know that they are fully empowered to execute the strategy and will receive unwavering support despite inevitable operational mistakes. Recognizing this, Bolduc used a decentralized pre-mission training approach to reinforce this methodology. The companies designed and executed their own training plans locally, which broke with large-scale battalion organized paradigms at the time. He also required the companies to develop supporting plans that described their operational approach for their assigned geographic area of responsibility in Afghanistan.
The Afghan National Auxiliary Police
TF-31’s training and preparation paid off, and events began to unfold as the strategy had intended. After Operation Medusa and another follow-up operation called Operation Bazuka, commanded by Major Jared Hill (read Lions of Kandahar authored by Major Rusty Bradley) an enduring hold force was required. The national police could not preserve the ground won, and the ANA were needed for other priorities. Bolduc sought out Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid, soliciting support for an irregular force approach.
TF-31 elements met with Governor Khalid and proposed the development of a tribal force that would partner with TF-31 Special Forces detachments and be responsible for ensuring the long-term security of Panjwai. This plan would leverage traditional local governance structures to establish governance, protect the populace, separate the threat from the populace and their operating areas, and force an elusive threat to expose itself. Connecting the village to district and provincial governance proved to be a difficult problem for the Taliban to overcome.
Tribal elders, the national police, and Governor Khalid were responsible for vetting the tribal candidates. The governor held shuras (traditional tribal meetings) with local elders returning to Panjwai to gain their support. He also served as the conduit with the Ministry of Interior and President Karzai to obtain support for the program.
The governor agreed to support the proposal and even traveled with the teams in Panjwai and surrounding districts to help get the program started. Formal and informal governance began to intersect, and top-down support was assured. Despite the support, the program did not necessarily go smoothly; ISAF elements responsible for providing official police training resisted and disparaged the program, alleging it would compete with provincial police forces for funding and equipment. In their view, it was an illegitimate militia that would damage the Afghan government in the long-term. They were successful in delaying funding for the program temporarily.
TF-31 immediately turned to their partners in the Central Intelligence Agency who agreed to fund the program until a formal system could be instituted through the Ministry of Interior. One detachment was assigned responsibility for designing a three-week training program, which included human rights and law of war training. The detachment chose Tarnak Farms[10] as the training area and started the first course and within five months, TF-31 had generated approximately 1,000 Afghan National Auxiliary Police. The detachments lived with the National Auxiliary Police to improve operational functionality.
From the onset, it was designed as a temporary force to hold key terrain in and around Kandahar, allowing the national police and the ANA to focus elsewhere. Eventually, National Auxiliary Police members were permitted to attend formal police and army training to become part of the formal Afghan security architecture. The ISAF Regional Command South Commanding General Major General Van Loon, a Dutch officer, commended TF-31 for this initiative and advocated its formalization.
Over time, the program was expanded into Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Nimroz, and Herat Provinces, with the force growing to 9,000 officers.[11] Yet the lack of a formal, overarching ISAF counterinsurgency strategy prevented rotating units from focusing on long-term objectives. As a result, after the TF-31departed, incoming SOF units returned once more to a counterterrorism centric strategy, focused more on targeting the Taliban directly and less on building partner capacity.
The program also suffered from a lack of national level ministerial and ISAF oversight and support. The National Auxiliary Police was deployed by the Afghan government beyond the geographical areas of tribe, clan, and qawm (a social unit in Afghanistan) linkage, and as a result it began to collapse. National Auxiliary Police elements began to create more problems than they resolved. The same set of circumstances that had negatively affected the Afghan Security Forces contributed to the collapse of the auxiliary police as well.
The Afghan Public Protection Program (2009-2010)
The abandonment of the National Auxiliary Police program in 2008 prevented the Afghan security architecture from holding terrain and protecting local populations from exploitation. ISAF and SOF elements continued to clear terrain of insurgents only to have them return later. In essence, units were fighting a decade-long war one year at a time.
Since the ISAF leadership and some SOF units continued to ignore the underlying causes of instability and failed to build an Afghan-based capacity to hold key terrain, conditions would necessitate another irregular force solution. Green Berets in Wardak Province (see figure 2), led by Major Brad Moses, initiated the Afghan Public Protection Program in March 2009. Given the proximity of the Taliban to Kabul (Wardak Province was directly west of Kabul), greater levels of national support were arrayed in support of this effort from the start. ISAF, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Defense Services would rapidly back the program.
Figure 2. Wardak Province in Afghanistan
As a result, the Ministry of Interior formalized the Public Protection Program early. Moses established an Afghan-led vetting process, a three-week training program, and fought for resources through the Ministry of Interior. It grew to approximately 1,200 personnel with a target growth projected at 8,000 (200 per district) and secured the major lines of communication running south and southeast from Kabul, critical infrastructure (bridges, dams, district centers), and the home villages of the participants from 2009-2010.[12] This bottom up local security organization complemented Afghan security forces was able to hold terrain and develop stability in villages and districts. This is something that the Afghan military and national police could not accomplish. Given member tribal affiliations, they proved exceptionally capable of securing the lines of communication and eliminating Taliban threats to security where stationed. Soon the security environment in Wardak began to improve. It appeared the program might succeed, but a few factors emerged that would negatively affect it.
First, the international community and human rights organizations held its controversial leader, former Taliban member Ghulam Mohammed Hotak, in contempt. Instead of seeing this as a potential opportunity for reintegration, many asserted he was recruiting active Taliban.[13] Some of the international community could not discern that local villagers joined any group that presented the greatest opportunity for their personal survival. Changing sides was part and parcel of tribal culture and a survival mechanism. Whatever their previous allegiances may have been, Hotak and his men aligned with the Afghan government.
Second, the lack of consistent resourcing facilitated the decline and eventual closure of the Public Protection Program. Third, ISAF redirected SOF from the Public Protection Program to the Afghan National Civil Order Police program. The Civil Order Police was an expeditionary formal police unit that was designed to deploy throughout the country in response to instability. It was created as an elite gendarmerie and initially conceived of as a riot control force but was also assigned to replace district-level police who were away for collective training.[14] SOF mentoring was seen as indispensable to the program’s success. The SOF-Public Protection Program partnership would become the victim of this new priority, similar to what had occurred previously with the National Auxiliary Police program.
ISAF transferred the Public Protection Program mission to the conventional forces to enable SOF to assume the Civil Order Police mission. Given the nascent nature of the Public Protection Program and lack of capacity of the conventional forces to mentor and adequately train the force, logistical support degraded, pay became irregular, and coalition support during enemy engagements eroded. The Public Protection Program’s distrust with the Afghan government and coalition grew, and they were left wondering why they had been abandoned. Eventually, Public Protection Program leader Ghulam Hotak quit out of frustration.
In hindsight, it is clear that operational conditions in Afghanistan demanded the employment of an irregular force and traditional governance approaches, but senior leaders did not hear calls for change. “There is a right way and a wrong way to approach the reconstruction of Afghan institutional structures,” Bolduc said in 2008. “The security forces, governmental structures and infrastructure development must remain consistent with the Afghan culture and their economic capability.”[15]
A paper written by an Army Special Forces officer, Jim Gant, in 2009 also highlighted the need for and advantages of irregular forces and traditional governance approaches in rural Afghanistan.[16] A growing chorus called for a change in strategy and approach in Afghanistan. Dr. Seth Jones, a RAND Corporation fellow, had the same observation: “Some of America’s most seasoned diplomats and military commanders in Afghanistan did understand the country, but they could not get through to their leaders, who were initially uninterested in nation building and distracted by Iraq.”[17] His book, In The Graveyard of Empires, proved decisive in breaching this barrier.
Jones compared the American experience in Afghanistan with that of others who attempted to operate there. He described the common challenges foreign invaders have always faced in Afghanistan since Alexander the Great in 330 BC. The challenges were surprisingly similar to those of the United States in 2009. Jones outlined some of the specific causes of American stagnation in Afghanistan: insufficient coalition manpower, diversion of U.S. forces and resources to Iraq, corruption of Afghan officials, poor Afghan leadership, Taliban exploitation of a religious ideology, and a safe haven in Pakistan. He advocated in part for “bottom-up” security and governance approaches. Jones successfully assisted SOF operators in persuading senior leaders that greater balance was needed regarding “bottom-up and top-down” approaches.[18]
While Jones and several SOF operators discussed alternative strategies, international resolve to stay the course in Afghanistan began to wane; calls for withdrawal and frustration over the lack of progress mounted.[19] After eight years of fighting, most Afghans polled viewed their government as generally ineffectual and corrupt.[20] The coalition continued to pursue an enemy-focused operational approach, development efforts were marginally effective at best, and Afghan governance and security capacities stagnated. There were some exceptions: cities expanded, more children attended school, medical care expanded, and some Afghan special operations units demonstrated success. On the whole, however, the Taliban grew in strength and influence.
Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police (2010-2014)
Beginning in 2009-2010, U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) initiative to embed SOF teams in contested villages across Afghanistan proved to be one of the most effective engagement methods employed in theater. The Local Defense Force initiative which morphed Village Stability Operations (VSOs) placed highly trained SOF units in rural villages to live and work among the villagers and advance stability in the region. Village stability works “backwards”: first, establish stability in the villages, and then connect village governance to the districts and the provinces. Investing in villages required rigorous analysis and a long-term commitment; it was also socially tiring. But the rewards were worth the risk: the central government cannot create stability without support from the villages.
A major component of VSO is the selection and training of local villagers who will compose a local defense force. In Afghanistan, these forces were referred to as ALP. Village elders hand-selected the members to provide security for their villages and defend against insurgent elements. They intentionally selected a group to represent the ethnic and tribal cross-section of the local populace.
While VSO and ALP achieved marked security gains, they were especially successful in promoting sustainable local and regional stability. When a VSO site was first established, the vast majority of SOF efforts were directed toward understanding the threat while simultaneously training the ALP force. Over time, units conducting VSO found themselves in the unique position to expand their involvement with the local populous from one narrowly focused on security to one of village growth and economic development.
The initial implementation strategy resembled the operational phases used in 2005-2007— “shape, hold, build, and transition”[21]—with SOF operations continuously enabling civil authority throughout the phases. The detachment first assesses the human terrain to determine whether a particular village will accept the proposition of defending themselves. This is the most important part of the process because the VSO strategy cannot be forced on the local population, they have to want it.
Once a location has been selected, the village holds a jirga or shura (tribal meetings) to decide whether to accept the proposition. If accepted, the SOF team lives among the population and “shapes” the security environment which in turn allows them to “hold” the village and surrounding territory through influence, deterrence, and the advent of a local police or militia.[22]
In the build phase, the SOF team connects the village or villages under its control with the district and provincial government. This phase resembles the larger control hub or civic action platform utilized in the Civilian Irregular Defense Group from Vietnam.[23] The villages, local population, and local police must feel that they are part of the larger national government. This in turn establishes a sense of ownership in the legitimacy of the system, feelings of nationalism, and creates the impression that the local villagers are firmly committed to a goal greater than themselves—in essence, the establishment of the social contract.
The final phase of the VSO strategy is the transition phase. This phase is one of the most delicate of the operation and can be compared to the latter stages of the CIDG strategy when Vietnamization occurred. During the transition phase, after certain metrics of success are met, the Special Forces detachment will hand the local defense force over to the national police or the ANA—or the local forces will disband, disarm, and reintegrate into society. It is important to place the same level of emphasis on this phase of the operation to avoid the fate of the Montagnards and their treatment by the South Vietnamese army.
The Establishment of the Local Defense Initiative (2009)
In mid-2009, General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of ISAF. An innovative problem solver,[24] he rapidly redefined how to fight the campaign. He directed the creation of a population centric campaign strategy and prioritized coalition efforts first and foremost toward Afghan security and governance capacity development. He drove unification of U.S. and coalition SOF effects. This forced the coalition to focus more on long-term objectives and encouraged new approaches to that end[25].
Moreover, the appropriate conditions aligned for a successful irregular force and traditional governance approach to succeed. One Green Beret, Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann, recognized this in 2009 and earned McChrystal’s support. Brigadier General Ed Reeder, the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) commander, supported the approach, and through his leadership and vision the Local Defense Initiative was born.
The Local Defense Initiative concept was straightforward: teams of Green Berets would attempt to gain the trust of local elders, live in their villages, develop local security forces, and support tribal council governance reformation and local economic development. It was hoped that this would permit the reemergence of rural governance to manage security and ultimately provide conflict resolution and development opportunities.
The coalition effort in Afghanistan was at a pivot point. Success required a full court press, as well as proven, innovative leaders. With McChrystal at the helm, a SOF commander was finally in charge of the campaign in Afghanistan, a campaign that was from the beginning an unconventional one. To round out the SOF team, Admiral Eric Olson, the SOCOM commander, handpicked Brigadier General Scott Miller and Colonel Donald Bolduc. Miller would lead CFSOCC-A, and Bolduc would assume command of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) underneath him. This partnership transformed SOF operational progress and ultimately defined how U.S. and coalition SOF would organize and operate for years to come in Afghanistan.
Three weeks prior to assuming command of CJSOTF-A, Bolduc conducted a comprehensive operational assessment of the command across Afghanistan. One of the shortcomings that it identified was the need for a more uniform focus on consistent partnership development across all operating units regardless of how far flung or disparate the environment. The Local Defense Initiative lacked operational level command emphasis resulting in the absence of a codified operational methodology, organizational supporting framework, and a formalized narrative explaining its purpose, intent, and benefit to the aggregate Afghan security architecture. The CJSOTF simply had not developed a larger organizational supporting plan or strategy that prioritized efforts in relation to McChrystal’s design.
Bolduc designated the Local Defense Initiative program as the CJSOTF-A’s main effort and formalized support for partner development. This realigned the CJSOTF’s operational priorities more effectively with McChrystal’s population centric campaign strategy. Additionally, it served to communicate to all subordinates what was paramount to organizational operational success. The staff shifted its effort from deliberate attack planning to Local Defense Initiative and partner training, development gaps and shortfalls became readily apparent. The training of formal security force partners such as the Afghan Commando Corps, their special forces teams, and special police units simply had never received sufficient attention. ANA Commandos (ANACDO) are trained to perform all kinds of missions and special operations against hostile forces in all environments. They are trained for urban and guerrilla warfare, combat search and reconnaissance. ANA commandos are also able to deal with hostage-taking situations, but their main goal is to spend every possible moment to help Afghan people, so it is not uncommon to see the members of ANA commandos escorting convoys of humanitarian aid or to see them distributing humanitarian aid directly[26].
These specialized forces played a critical role in establishing and maintaining the conditions necessary for large-scale development and sustainment of indigenous forces. They possessed unique capabilities to address dynamic and evolving threats. It is important to highlight the aggregate supporting architecture that enabled indigenous force employment. U.S. and NATO SOF had been creating and maintaining this architecture. It was essential at this juncture to begin to establish the conditions necessary to enable an eventual transfer of this responsibility to Afghan units. Their institutional development was key to achieving this objective.
These Afghan units were not capable of managing force management administration, logistics, and command and control functions independently, so the coalition elements managed these institutional functions for them in large measure. CJSOTF-A took a number of steps to address these shortfalls and recognized that the Local Defense Initiative program could end up not being self-sustaining if preemptive actions were not taken.
Organizational restructuring helped answer some of these institutional developmental challenges. A formalized Afghan school and supporting cadre would be required. No longer could the training of Afghan Ministry of Defense Special Operations Forces to be additional task for one battalion. It needed to be an independent command.
Bolduc selected Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Howe to design and build the Afghan Special Operations School, which would become the Afghan National Army Special Operation Advisory Group. This school would administer everything from recruitment to reiterative training of multiple special operations forces skill sets. Afghan Ministry of Defense officials were required to participate in the school’s design and development from day one to inculcate a sense of responsibility for its management and to facilitate an eventual seamless transition.
It was also apparent that this evolving Special Operations School would require a significant amount of support and coordination with the Ministry of Defense and the Afghan government. Bolduc requested that the school be re-aligned from the CJSOTF-A directly under CFSOCC-A to acquire this critical executive-level assistance by Miller and his staff. This would also serve to allow more internal attention by the CJSOTF-A on Local Defense Initiative.
The successful development of the Local Defense Initiative would require the same level of attention and intellectual capital investment. It was clear that it required a uniquely qualified program manager. General Miller appointed Lieutenant Colonel Scott Mann the director of the Local Defense Initiative program, charged with leading collective enterprise efforts necessary to ensure local governance and security force development. He would have to define how to leverage the support of multiple Afghan ministries and a host of U.S. interagency actors and non-governmental organizations.
Mann eventually integrated these stakeholders into a global network to help analyze causes of rural instability and address them. Bolduc simultaneously sought to codify the program; he leveraged students from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, to assess and draft the Local Defense Initiative’s operational methodology. Lessons from the Afghan Security Forces, highway patrolmen, National Auxiliary Police, and Public Protection Program had also demonstrated the importance of early self-branding. While the program had a name, the forces needed a name other than “Local Defense Forces.” LDI was a US name not an Afghan name. This was a source of consternation with President Karzai.
Bolduc quickly formed a team to rename the program and develop a multi-dimensional engagement strategy. Miller would work with ISAF to determine an acceptable name for the program. He would also solicit recommendations from the Afghan government resulting in a signed presidential decree officially recognizing Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police. This decree was essential for securing Afghan non-security and security institutional support.
Acceptance of the program by the Afghan government was key to gaining the Afghan government’s buy in and ultimate success. Afghanistan itself needed to own the problem. President Karzai was uncomfortable with militias and insisted on an Afghan government connection to a local defense force. CJSOTF-A had to clearly communicate the program’s purpose and demonstrate there was no connections to militias. VSO accomplished this objective through the superb skills of the SOF teams. In time, it would evolve and empower local informal governance and assist the central government in touching local governance through the local security forces and district center.
Codifying all aspects of the program and having a “brand” with approval of the Afghan government proved essential in winning the support of the ISAF commander, USAID, the U.S. Department of State, and ultimately funding from the U.S. House of Representatives. Bolduc also adapted the command’s organizational structure to provide the top-down support that had always been missing or unsustainable in previous programs. First, he formed a cell in the plans section of the staff to help with the logistical, administrative, and resourcing of the ALP program. This cell was directly linked to the CFSOCC-A headquarters in Kabul and coalition liaison officers in the Ministry of Interior. It would eventually integrate liaisons arrayed at provincial and district centers as well. Bolduc also established supporting administrative and logistical cell, which could be used as a push system, anticipating resourcing requirements. Simultaneously, he mandated the development of a 24-month campaign support plan. This was intended to establish continuity and unity of effort for VSO/ALP and partner development efforts and mitigate some of the friction from units rotating every six months.
Bolduc also redesigned the CJSOTF-A operations center, historically a brigade level command and control element. It was transformed into a situational awareness room. This reflected his view that the purpose of the command was to enable subordinates. This allowed the headquarters to move valuable manpower and intellectual capital from the arguably bloated headquarters to subordinate units and within the staff where they were desperately needed. It allowed Bolduc to establish an effects directorate under Navy Commander Josh Lasky. The 24-month plan established clear lines of effort, intermediate military objectives, and supporting effects. The assessment cell applied the appropriate metrics to determine what was and was not working. This improved operational level decision-making. This was the first-time population centric metrics were provided to demonstrate clear progress in security, governance, and development. As a result, General Petraeus made VSO and ALP his main effort[27].
In an effort to broaden situational awareness and improve unity of effort, Bolduc invited coalition and Afghan special operations forces to join the CJSOTF-A staff. He gave each a desk in the situation awareness room: Emirates, Australians, Canadians, Afghan Commandos, and French personnel. Bolduc extended the same invitation to the U.S. interagency community. This broadened operational synchronization and improved effectiveness. It also resulted in an expansion of combat power. As allies felt more involved, they increasingly volunteered to support various missions and effort. NATO special operations elements targeted Taliban networks in areas that complemented CJSOTF-A operations, while the UAE even volunteered to conduct VSO.
Miller’s “flat communication” construct was an additional organizational initiative that helped the entire ALP/VSO and partner development enterprise. Since he had taken command, Miller insisted on flat organizational communications, encouraging everyone at every level to communicate openly and freely regardless of organizational hierarchy. This permitted expanded situational awareness across the command, much more rapid and effective problem identification, and resolution with an organizational construct that was based on small teams distributed in remote areas operating in a decentralized approach.
The command’s collective partner development and operational efforts improved dramatically. Miller and his staff in Kabul rapidly effected change for teams on the ground across Afghanistan. For example, ineffective district police chiefs and governors were now removed in a month or two; previously, it took six, if they were removed at all. Equipping and pay issues were now resolved within days versus months, and senior ISAF leaders received relevant and detailed tactical level reports from Miller that were not redacted by multiple intermediate commands. Understandably, most leaders want to resolve problems at their level before reporting it, but unredacted reports can reveal broader system and programmatic gaps and failures.
This reporting system helped to reveal that the re-vetting of the ALP and other Afghan partners had not occurred. Although they had been thoroughly vetted during the recruiting process, they had not been re-vetted later. The initial vetting began with tribal elder recommendation, national police endorsement, biometric enrollment, drug/medical screening, and psychological testing and interviews. The names of individuals who passed initial screening were then forwarded to the Ministry of Interior in Kabul for final approval before training commenced. But after initial screening, the Afghans had no mechanism in place to weed out individuals who were or became liabilities.
More emphasis should have been placed on re-vetting given the high threat of insurgent infiltration. Due to the need to rapidly build the ALP capability, Special Forces detachments were often operating as split teams. Instead of all 12 detachment members being located together which is the norm, they were split to double the ALP capacity. But given the remoteness of their locations, it induced additional risk, so insider threats presented a real threat. Beyond helping to identify potential insider threats, the re-vetting also served to verify an accurate ALP accounting for pay, which limited the potential for graft in the Ministry of Interior and helped cleanse the program of those violating drug and behavioral standards. The re-vetting process took about a month to complete, and it eliminated only a small percentage of participants and improved force management accounting accuracy.
Due to the broader information flow that came from flat communications, another gap was identified: Detachments encountered difficulty acquiring intelligence from women and children in communities in which they resided. Given they represented over 50% of the local population, they were missing valuable intelligence on insurgent activities and insights into tribal and political matters. They were also the ones most affected by development efforts: schools, clinics, security, and improvements in agricultural production.
As a result, CJSOTF-A attached experienced female medical service noncommissioned officers to the SOF teams in the Uruzgan and Kandahar provinces. The results proved promising: team situational awareness improved, and micro-economic development expanded. In time, SOF formalized the program into what became Cultural Support Teams, and the initiative would ultimately influence the Pentagon’s thinking regarding the roles of women in combat. The program had its share of ups and downs as it evolved, but it did validate that there were clear operational advantages to U.S. female service member integration in counterinsurgency and stability operations.[28]
Progammatics, Structure, and Enablers
As organizational structures and supporting initiatives were refined, the command’s supporting capacities expanded as well. The enterprise learned the importance of cultural demographic analysis, persistent stakeholder engagement, the value of liaisons partnered with district and provincial authorities, and the need to control program growth to ensure quality. The CJSOTF conducted a deliberate tribal analysis, often lasting weeks or months, to select VSO/ALP sites based on their potential. The assessments were critical to understand every aspect of social structure, stakeholder influence/politics, geography, and threat conditions. Over time, a number of recurring characteristics emerged, such as: evolution occurred more rapidly when existing tribal structures existed, tribal homogeneity acted as a growth catalyst, and living between competing subtribes avoided negatively impacting natural balances of power. Codifying these and other findings helped optimize the program’s methodology.
The command developed a comprehensive information operations plan and a structured media engagement plan. Another element vital to the expansion and success of the program was a tiered engagement strategy. At the tactical level, teams conducted radio broadcasts and face-to-face engagements with local stakeholders and populations. At the operational level, the CJSOTF briefed interagency and Afghan ministerial elements. Opening the program to media scrutiny, early and often, enabled the command to help drive the narrative versus having to spend significant amounts of time defending the program.
As the program expanded, it became glaringly apparent that most Afghan district officials, and some provincial officials, were woefully inept at executing the responsibilities of their offices. Yet, the program was dependent on these officials to succeed. Thus, the CJSOTF embedded liaison teams—Provincial Advisory Teams and District Advisory Teams—to improve the various district and provincial offices. These liaison officers mentored district governors and police chiefs on security issues and helped them develop processes and mechanisms to ensure the ALP were adequately equipped and paid on time. A capable district office was critical to transferring control of the ALP to the Afghanis so the detachment could transition to a new location to expand the program. If the Afghan government consistently supported the ALP, and district representatives and tribal elders routinely met with them, then success had been achieved. Some sites still failed, but in a majority of cases the advisory teams managed to improve performance of district and provincial centers.
The program began to blossom, approaching 10,000 ALP in 2010. To avoid the fate of earlier security efforts, the CJSOTF sought to institutionalize the gains. While some stakeholders did not fully recognize or agree with the ALP/VSO construct, they could not argue with its success on the ground. It was so effective that the Taliban viewed the ALP program as a direct threat to their strategic success and their number one priority to attack.[29]
The multilateral engagement strategy that was formed months earlier advocating support for the program produced dividends. Popular opinion of the Afghan provincial governance improved[30]. Representatives from other U.S. agencies began to view the program as a means to help facilitate their development and governance capacity objectives. In August 2010 President Karzai’s issued a presidential decree authorizing the ALP as a formalized Afghan security element under the Ministry of Interior.[31] Afghan Brigadier General Sherzai was appointed to lead and manage the program.
Although a significant milestone had been accomplished, a long road lay ahead for the program and its supporters. Miller wanted to ensure institutional success not only with the ALP, but for all of SOF’s Afghan partners. He established a senior leader mentoring program where he and other senior leaders directly mentored their Afghan counterparts. Institutional development occurred in the earliest phases of the program, a key element for long-term program success.
When General David Petraeus took command of ISAF in 2010, the ALP program had already improved security in select areas. He visited VSO sites in Kandahar, as well as Jim Gant’s site in Kunar. Petraeus was so impressed with the potential of the program that he personally advocated for its expansion, called it a “game changer,” and characterized it to the U.S. Congress as an essential piece of the Afghan security architecture needed to improve security and stability.[32]
In June 2011, Petraeus and Afghan officials agreed to increase the authorized strength of the ALP from 10,000 to 30,000 despite only having 6,500 police at 41 sites.[33] Without Petraeus’s support, the program certainly would not have evolved to become a pillar of the Afghan security architecture. Once it was announced that the target of 30,000 had been established, CFSOCC-A and CJSOTF-A furiously analyzed how to accomplish this in a manner consistent with the program’s tenets. It was fortuitous that the 24-month campaign supporting plan was already in place because it provided the framework; however, the mechanics of the expansion required significant analysis. From where would the additional manpower come? What were the costs? How would one manage distribution of the ALP? Most importantly, how would the command maintain program standards, a quality over quantity conundrum?
Probably the greatest reasons for program success was the effect of direct, long-term mentorship by SOF. A RAND study would later reveal that successful sites required an average of 15 months of direct mentoring.[34] Long-term SOF partnering improved not only combat skills, but ALP behaviors. This did as much to legitimize the force as their ability to defend against Taliban incursions. CFSOCC-A requested an additional Army Special Forces battalion to meet growth demands, but with concurrent force commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOCOM was unable to fulfill the request.
Ultimately, an additional Special Forces battalion headquarters was authorized, and although valuable, it did not answer the need for operational teams. After studying the issue, Bolduc and the battalion commanders agreed that “split team” operations were part of the solution where risk was manageable. With the lack of available Special Forces detachments, SOCOM provided Navy SEAL teams and Marine Special Operations Teams to support the VSO/ALP mission. This may not sound unusual in today’s context, but at the time it was contentious at senior command levels in the special operations community.
The SEALs and Marine Special Operations Teams had traditionally filled direct action roles, partnering with Afghan commandos and other Afghan special operations elements focused on capturing or killing Taliban. Missions involving the development of indigenous irregular forces had historically been the domain of U.S. Army Special Forces elements. Some senior special operations leaders expressed displeasure and concern that others would now compete with Army Special Forces for what had been their core mission. They also decried split team operations in Afghanistan, arguing that it “was going to get people killed,” as one general officer warned.[35] This kind of parochial thinking from Fort Bragg had inhibited progress for years. In theater, the ISAF and IJC commanders empowered General Miller to support these initiatives to ensure the program’s growth so that SOF would operate in a more integrated and flexible manner moving forward. Bolduc went further and leveraged his own staff, building a small team to support the UAE’s special operations forces as they attempted to conduct VSO in southeast Kandahar, near the Pakistan border.
CFSOCC-A also requested a conventional infantry battalion to augment the CJSOTF-A. This was precedent setting and led to a shift in conventional forces/SOF interoperability. The intent was to split more teams and augment them with infantry squads to maximize growth, maintain program standards, and ensure adequate force protection. But this was not a mission for which infantry forces had ever been trained. The concept was ultimately approved, although grudgingly by some senior conventional forces leaders worried that the unit would be relegated to fire base guards and taken advantage of by SOF. So, in the summer of 2011, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Buzzard an infantry battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division, deployed to support the VSO mission and standup a Special Operations Task Force in northern Afghanistan.[36]
The skeptics were proven wrong as it was proven to be a success. Not one SOF tam or split was overrun by Taliban insurgents, and it demonstrated that non-traditional SOF and conventional forces command and control relationships can work. In northern Afghanistan, the infantry battalion headquarters, supported by an Army Special Forces company headquarters, commanded multiple special forces detachments, a SEAL platoon, an infantry rifle company, a heavy weapons company, and elements of a forward support company and a headquarters company. It worked remarkably well and validated the value of an adaptive methodology in a complex and dynamic environment. The combined effects of such force restructuring and employment methodology enabled the VSO/ALP mission to advance and more importantly redefine future SOF and conventional forces operational constructs and command and control approaches.[37]
The program’s operational success fueled additional support for the program. The VSO program was a relative bargain when compared to the cost of other security programs. The development and employment of an ALP officer cost one-fourth of a national police officer and one-sixth of an ANA soldier.[38] It proved to be an effective and economical approach to rural security, a significant advantage in an economy where 90% of its gross domestic product comes from international donors. Security solutions must be cost effective long-term to be viable.
Unlike the national police and ANA, the ALP demonstrated sustained improvements in rural security. According to the 2011 Afghan National Safety Office, insurgent attacks dropped 42% in Kunduz, 64% in Baghlan, and 76% in Takhar.[39] Seeing this data and the projected $180 million a year price tag for 30,000 ALP, the U.S. Congress approved multi-year funding.[40]
As Bolduc and General Miller rotated out of Afghanistan in the summer of 2011, the program had a solid foundation, a long-term supporting plan, significant improvements in security had been achieved, and U.S. and coalition SOF were more operationally integrated. Institutional evolution advanced with Afghan special operations partners, and they were more effectively recruiting, training, resourcing, and executing command and control responsibilities.
The rapid expansion and success of the VSO/ALP approach required a significant amount of operational and strategic support. Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reagan, CJSOTF-A Support Battalion Commander, led these operational support operations for the CJSOTF-A. He aligned a logistics cell focused on this one function, contracting small fixed wing aircraft to support troop movement, air dropping thousands of tons of supplies and materials each month, and contracting and acquiring a fleet of ground vehicles and ATVs.
Miller understood that he could only expand with sufficient support. He requested a cell be formed at SOCOM to support this burgeoning enterprise. This VSO/ALP support team at SOCOM ultimately dedicated more than $160 million in support funding for SOF involved in the operation, from vehicles to expeditionary field kitchens and shower units.
Simultaneously, Mann built and led a team of VSO subject matter experts for six months on the ground in Kandahar. He designed an innovative and enhanced pre-deployment training and education platform for SOF. Teams would learn about Afghan history and culture from Afghans and esteemed academicians, gaining insight into causes of rural instability. They would hear from recently returning VSO SOF operators on what does and does not work. Mann transformed pre-deployment training from basic combat skill training to something more akin to graduate level education. Operators would routinely comment that it was the best pre-deployment education that they had received in their careers.[41]
Having witnessed what Miller and Bolduc achieved informally in terms of SOF interoperability, Admiral McRaven proposed formally unifying all U.S. and coalition SOF under a singular headquarters. A team was established to formulate the concept and support it at SOCOM.
Six months later, the headquarters was on the ground in Afghanistan led by Major General Tony Thomas. Under Thomas’s leadership, the SOJTF-A would produce what McRaven had envisioned: unprecedented SOF unity of effort. The command focused efforts in key areas to achieve unified effects. Insurgent threats were marginalized in these locations and critical time and space was created for improvement in governance and expansion of the VSO/ALP program.
During his command, Thomas tasked recently promoted Brigadier General Bolduc to oversee all VSO/ALP efforts. He mentored ALP senior leaders and managed the supporting functions of the program through them. As the ALP program grew, multiple regional ALP training centers were established so that the Ministry of Interior could train and educate officers independently in the long run.
Through the Ministry of Interior, SOJTF-A established direct deposit salary payments for some ALP members near major population centers, which mitigated corruption and helped the Ministry of Interior form salary payment teams to limit graft in more remote areas.
Near the end of 2012, the VSO/ALP program methodology was revised to reflect changing operational conditions, and plans were purposely synchronized with USAID to ensure efforts were mutually supporting. With these critical modifications, the program expanded to approximately 29,000. By March 2013, the program extended into key terrain encompassing approximately 84 districts, which represented almost every province.[42]
Future growth and ALP alignment was increasingly focused on persistent insurgent safe havens and areas where coalition forces were withdrawing. Many Afghan politicians increasingly viewed ALP as a backstop against future Taliban incursions. Every parliamentarian wanted ALP in their districts, thereby jeopardizing plans to mass them in key terrain districts. To prevent their misuse, a considerable amount of work was required by the SOJTF-A staff to dissuade stakeholders and ensure ALP/VSO were aligned where they were most operationally beneficial. Additionally, the program was becoming a victim of its own success as calls for rapid program expansion grew louder.
The paradox of quantity versus quality began to emerge. Tactical success fueled demand for ALP. Some conventional forces units even started independent programs, which ultimately required SOF involvement and their dismantling of these programs because they had become dysfunctional by not ascribing to the VSO/ALP methodology.
Additionally, SOF teams felt the pressure to build ALP force structure at the risk of ignoring rural development and governance assistance. Bolduc and Thomas actively worked to manage this challenge, but the Afghans and ISAF were searching for ways to mitigate the effects of the U.S. drawdown. Since the program’s inception, the U.S. administration had surged forces into Afghanistan, and in 2011 their withdrawal began. By the summer of 2012 and with the signing of the strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, a complete withdrawal of forces was scheduled for the end of 2014. This decision forced U.S. military leaders to make hard choices on the prioritization of efforts.
Thomas and Bolduc raced to ensure that the Ministry of Interior could independently manage and run the ALP program. All involved parties realized that soon SOF would no longer be able to live in the villages with the ALP and mentor them. The Ministry of Interior would have to assume this role with the help of Afghan special forces teams. SOF support would assume a backside programmatic and senior leader and staff mentoring function.
There have been a number of hiccups along the way. Without mentoring, some ALP have since caused as many problems as they have rectified, but Afghans will have to adapt and modify the program to ensure its functionality.
In 2013, the Ministry of Interior managed the program and began to transition it to Afghan government control in selected areas. Due to the success of VSO and ALP and unprecedented security gains, there were calls in 2013 by the Afghan director of National Defense Services to expand the ALP to 45,000.[43]
VSO and ALP demonstrated the fact that formal Afghan defense forces lack the capability to hold key rural terrain and will continue to be dependent on irregular force security solutions. The irregular forces have and will continue to play a critical role in Afghanistan’s constantly evolving and dynamic security environment. They fill a gap created by national, provincial, and district governance dysfunction and corruption. Irregular forces also address unique cultural and social characteristics reflective of Afghanistan’s tribal society.
Conclusion
Developing successful irregular force programs is an exceedingly difficult and complex process. The VSO/ALP model demonstrates the importance of possessing an in-depth historic and cultural understanding of the operational environment. It implies that it is uniquely a SOF mission and suggests the need to fully assess the risks, costs, and benefits before commencing program development. The VSO/ALP program highlights the advantage of outlining a comprehensive supporting framework that integrates “bottom-up and top-down” efforts seamlessly. It proof of the vital need for a multi-dimensional engagement strategy. The VSO/ALP program succeeded because it addressed rural security and instability challenges through the reformation of tribal governance and security mechanisms supported through a central authority at the district and provincial levels as part of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy.
VSO/ALP represented the quintessential SOF counterinsurgency and irregular warfare mission, combining both direct and indirect approaches in a balanced and integrated fashion. It played to SOF organizational strengths: adaptability, fungibility, small unit decentralized execution, and specialized skill set and tradecraft capabilities. Additionally, it demonstrated the effectiveness of a command and control construct, where SOF is supported by conventional forces, interagency partners, international partners and organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Although it has experienced some setbacks, ALP remains a pillar of the Afghan security architecture today despite the large-scale U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan.
While every village stability site was different, the observations contained in this paper will enable leaders to execute VSO on a fundamental and effective level. To be successful VSO required four essential elements: (1) NATO and ISAF support; (2) international support; (3) Afghan government support; and (4) a willing populace. This complex process is one where we are always learning. Village stability is a building block component that ultimately contributes to security at the district level. In this hour of strategic importance for our country, there is no greater task for SOF to undertake than empowering the Afghan people to stand on their own.
In late 2013, due to proposed policy changes and changes in military strategy, SOF would stop supporting the VSO/ALP program. Brigadier General Bolduc did his best to delay the change in policy, but the Obama Administration and the ISAF Commander were moving towards opening up a non-combat operations phase of the Afghan War. Bolduc argued that despite all the progress we are at a critical time where the Ministry of Interior down to the local villages still required USSOF advising and assisting during the transition phase. Changing strategy now will result in a resurgence and of the Taliban and reverse the security in the rural areas. In addition, we will see a rise in casualties. By June of 2013 we had the Taliban and AQ degraded, disrupted, and nearly neutralized. The Taliban did their best to fight back. The Taliban had designated the ALP their number one threat and target. A communication from Mulla Omar was intercepted in 2011 stating that the village support by the Americans is our largest threat. If this continues, we will not be able to control the villages. As of June 2013, the ALP never lost a battle with the Taliban.
As of 2016, all gains in security achieved by the VSO/ALP program had been lost. The premature ending of VSO and the support to the ALP can be assessed as an unmitigated disaster. In 2013 the Afghan government controlled more than 90% of the rural areas. By 2016, the Taliban had resurged, AQ had resurged, and ISIS was on its way in. By 2018 the Taliban owned the rural areas and by 2019, the US had its highest casualty rate in Afghan War.[44] In 2021 the United States conducted a withdrawal from Afghanistan that was a total disaster. As of 2025, not one senior civilian, general officer, or admiral has been held accountable for losing the war and conducting a withdrawal assessed as one of history’s worst. Many were promoted and went to make millions in the defense industry.
Indigenous forces will continue to play a critical role in Afghanistan’s constantly evolving and dynamic security environment. They fill a gap created by national, provincial, and district governance dysfunction and corruption. Indigenous forces also address unique cultural and social characteristics reflective of Afghanistan’s tribal society.
Developing successful irregular force programs is an exceedingly difficult and complex process. The VSO/ALP model demonstrates the criticality of possessing an in-depth historic and cultural understanding of the operational environment. It is uniquely a SOF mission and suggests the need to fully assess the costs, benefits, and risks before commencing program development. And once started, it requires long term commitment.
The VSO/ALP program succeeded because it addressed rural security and instability challenges through the reformation of tribal governance and security mechanisms supported through a central authority at the district and provincial levels.
Although not perfect, VSO/ALP represented the quintessential SOF counterinsurgency and irregular warfare mission, combining both direct and indirect approaches in a balanced and integrated fashion. It played to SOF organizational strengths: adaptability, fungibility, small unit decentralized execution, and specialized skill set and tradecraft capabilities. Additionally, it demonstrated the effectiveness of a command and control construct, where SOF is supported by conventional forces. Although it has experienced serious setbacks, ALP remains a pillar of the Afghan security architecture today despite the large-scale U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan.
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AUTHOR BIOS
After 36 years of active duty service to his country in which he received 2 awards for valor, 5 Bronze Star medals, 2 Purple Hearts, led ten deployments, and survived both a bomb blast, numerous fire fights, and a helicopter crash. Brigadier General (Ret.) Donald C. Bolduc served as commander, Special Operations Command Africa. His command assignments include Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command, Afghanistan; Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force – Afghanistan; 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, Afghanistan; C Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne); Operational Detachment Alpha-582 Commander, B Company 3rd Battalion 5th Special Forces (Airborne); HHC, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne); and deputy director of Operations at U.S. Africa Command. As one of the few senior military officers, and, at the time, the only active duty general officer on record, to openly discuss his own struggles with post-traumatic stress (PTS), General Bolduc has used his leadership position to change the conversation to one of understanding and acceptance through his own experiences. Dubbed “Captain America” and “Everyone’s General” by his fellow officers and soldiers, General Bolduc always put country first, and now works with his wife Sharon to continue his service off the battlefield sharing his leadership mantra of “People, Family, Mission” and his personal experiences with mental health to continue his leadership journey and to help educate others. After retirement Bolduc served as an Associate Professor at New England College, was the Republican Party nominee for the US Senate, and is now a full-time Sergeant at the Barnstead Police Department.
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Chris Hensley retired after 22 years of active service in the U.S. Army, approximately 16 of those years in the U.S. Army’s Special Forces. He has been assigned to 5th and 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Command, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School as well as Special Operations Command. During that time, Mr. Hensley conducted six rotations in Afghanistan, one in Kuwait, Jordan and Kazakhstan. Prior to becoming a Green Beret, Mr. Hensley was an Infantry Officer serving in South Korea and the 3rd Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard). He is currently a strategic planner for Booz Allen Hamilton in the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) J5.
[1] The U.S. Department of Defense first defined irregular forces as “Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces” in 2009 in Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 5, 2009), GL-7, but rescinded the definition with the 2013 edition of the Joint Publication.
[2] See, for example, Diana S. Correll, “How the ‘Horse Soldiers’ helped liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban 18 years ago,” Military Times, October 23, 2019.
[3] Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)
[4] Ibid., 338.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Fred Kaplan, “It’s Obama’s War Now,” Slate.com, May 11, 2009, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/05/the-ouster-of-afghanistan-commander-david-mckiernan-could-make-or-break-the-obama-presidency.html.
[7] Lisa Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense,” RAND National Research Institute, 2012, p. 2.
[8] A provincial reconstruction team is a “civil-military team designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation or local provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), GL-7, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf.
[9] A line of communication is the route that connects an operating military unit with its supply base. Supplies and reinforcements are transported along the line of communication. Therefore, a secure and open line of communication is vital for any military force to continue to operate effectively.
[10] The U.S. nearly launched a raid to grab Bin Ladin from Tarnak Farms in 1998 when he used it as a base. See, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 111-112.
[11] Mathieu Lefevre, “The Afghanistan Public Protection Program and the Local Defence Initiative,” in Martine van Bijlert & Sari Kouvo eds., Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance (2001-2011) (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012).
[12] Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP,” 5.
[13] Just Don’t Call it a Militia, Impunity and Militias See, September 12, 2011.
[14] Robert M. Perito, “Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police: Victim of Its Own Success,” United States Institute for Peace Special Report 307, May 2012.
[15] Donald C. Bolduc, “Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan, Small Wars Journal, 2008.
[16] Jim Gant, “One Tribe at a Time,” 2009. Ultimately Jim Gant, who was sometimes referred to as “Lawrence of Afghanistan,” had an equally spectacular fall. See, “Elliot Hannon, “Green Beret Kicked Out of Army for Alcohol, Pills, and Secretly Living with His Wife in Afghanistan, Slate.com, June 25, 2014, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/06/green-beret-jim-gants-fall-from-grace-in-afghanistan.html.
[17] Seth Jones, In The Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Five Reasons to Withdraw from Afghanistan, Claims of “Real” and Sustainable No longer ring true. It’s Time to Rethink War
The National Interest, Five Reasons to Withdraw from Afghanistan, 2012
[20] United National Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent patterns and trends (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).
[21] Counterinsurgency doctrine includes “clear” in the “Shape, clear hold, build, and transition construct.” We chose not to include clear because it was too disruptive to clear an elusive enemy. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 5, 2018), VII-6.
[22] A shaping operation is “an operation that establishes the conditions for decision operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.” See, U.S. Department Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-0: Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016), 4-6
[23] See, for example, Eugene G. Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The First Years: 1916-1967,” Veritas 5, no. 4 (2009), https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cidgprogram.pdf
[24] Liam Collins, “Military Innovation in War: The Criticality of the Senior Military Leader,” PhD diss., (Princeton University, 2014), 306-412.
[25] ISAF 2009 Comprehensive Counter Insurgency Strategy, GEN Stanley McCrystal, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs November 10, 2009.
[26] SPEC OPS Magazine, March 12, 2020
[27] JSOU Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police, Mark Moyar, 2014
[28] Megan Katt, “Blurred Lines: Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan,” Joint Forces Quarterly 75, no. 4 (2014): 106-113.
[29] This came from various intelligence reports.
[30] Afghanistan in 2013, A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, page 9
[31] Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” October 2011, p. 68
[32] Full Text Testimony to Congress, Bill Roggio, March 15th, 2011 | [email protected] .
[33] Mark Moyar, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2014), 51.
35 VSO/ALP Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense, Lisa Saum-Manning, 2012.
[35] Based on a personal phone conversation with USASOC Commander Special Forces General in June 2010.
[36] From e-mail with Curtis Buzzard, October 8, 2020.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Diplomatic courier, Building a Viable Local Security Force, Gerald Fulcher and Alec Mackenzie, February 12, 2012.
[39] Afghan NGO Safety Office, Quarterly Report, Q4 2011.
[40] Diplomatic courier, Building a Viable Local Security Force, Gerald Fulcher and Alec Mackenzie, February 12, 2012.
[41] General David H. Petraeus, conference remarks, CFSOCC-A Village Stability/Afghan Local Police Conference, 9 April 2011.
[42] Small Wars Journal, VSO/ALP, Lisa Saum-Manning, December, 2012
[43] The Afghan War in 2013 Security and the ANSF, Cordesman, pg, 112.
[44] US Combat Deaths Hit Five Year High, by Zachary Halaschak, 22 August, 2019.