The Navy is trying to swap paperwork for prototypes.
The Secretary of the Navy has moved to stand up a Naval Air Warfare Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) while trimming and consolidating offices that haven’t delivered. The aim is simple: get tools to sailors faster, and stop funding organizations that exist to coordinate meetings rather than win fights. Congress authorized the RCO in the FY24 defense bill, and the department is now standing it up to rapidly develop and field new capabilities.
What the new office is—and isn’t
By law, the Naval Air Warfare RCO sits inside the Department of the Navy with a leader designated by the Commander of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). An executive board—vice chief of naval operations, Marine assistant commandant, the Navy’s top acquisition official (ASN RDA), and the NAVAIR commander—provides oversight. That structure is designed to cut through the maze that slows urgent programs and to use streamlined authorities like Other Transaction Agreements when it makes sense.
The mission set, laid out when lawmakers pushed the idea in 2023, centers on fast development and fielding of naval aviation capabilities: low-cost rapid-reaction weapons, electronic warfare and other non-kinetic effects, and integrated targeting solutions. Think: “good enough, now” upgrades and prototypes that ride along on existing airframes rather than decade-long clean-sheet dreams.
This RCO joins a growing Navy ecosystem built for speed. In 2023, the department chartered a Disruptive Capabilities Office (DCO) to quickly apply new tech to operational problems—designed to work with Marine Corps rapid-capability efforts. Several program offices have also stood up their own rapid cells; for example, the surface-warfare enterprise created a rapid capabilities team to push fleet experiments into the line faster. The new NAVAIR RCO plugs into that network with aviation as its center of gravity.
What’s getting shut down or reshaped
The push isn’t only about building a new team—it’s about killing drag. Department-wide guidance under the current administration directs leaders to shutter offices that haven’t produced significant capability in years and to consolidate duplicative functions. The Navy has already begun reviewing portfolios, with memos from the new SECNAV terminating contracts and grants that don’t align with near-term warfighting outcomes. Separate orders across the naval services have closed DEI-branded offices in line with White House direction. The through-line: shrink the coordination layer, reward delivery.
This reorg sits inside a larger Pentagon push to speed up acquisition, lean into Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) and OTAs, and elevate Rapid Capabilities Offices across the services as preferred paths for getting hardware into the field. That’s now baked into policy—along with the legal definition of these RCOs, which explicitly includes the Naval Air Warfare RCO.
What changes at the deck-plate level—now
Near term, the RCO gives fleet commanders a hotline for problems that can’t wait for a new program of record: counter-drone hard-kills and soft-kills for air wings; quick-fit electronic-attack pods; data-fusion widgets that help shooters find and hit at sea under jamming. It also creates a home for rapid airborne integration with the Navy’s growing unmanned portfolio, where the need is obvious and painful. Recent reporting shows the Navy’s autonomy push has hit snags—from software collisions to leadership churn—proof that fielding novel tech is messy and that the acquisition machine needs a pit crew, not a parade. The RCO is that pit crew for aviation.
The benefit to operators is cycle time. Instead of watching a good idea sink into a requirements swamp, squadrons can see iterative kits—trialed at places like Pax River—spin out to detachments in months. Surface-warfare rapid cells are already doing variants of this; the aviation RCO should mirror that cadence with flight-tested packages sailors can bolt on, fly, break, fix, and refine.
The long game: faster, cheaper, and more honest
Long-term success depends on discipline. The new office will have to resist gold-plating, publish blunt after-action reports, and measure wins in “weeks to fleet” rather than glossy briefings. Oversight from the vice CNO, ASN RDA and NAVAIR gives it the horsepower to redirect money and talent toward what works and scrap what doesn’t. Tie awards to delivered capability; keep requirements short; exploit OTAs when industry can move faster than government; and, when the prototype proves out, hand it cleanly to a program office with funding already queued. That’s the flywheel.
There’s risk here. Breaking and consolidating offices can leave gaps if leaders swing the axe without a plan. Tech offices across the Pentagon are being reorganized, and the Navy will need to guard against losing the few bureaucrats who actually know how to get money out the door. Clear swim lanes between the DCO, the new RCO, and the program executive offices will prevent friendly fire.
But the strategic case is strong. Adversaries are iterating at sea and in combat. The fleet is training against swarms and novel threats because they’re real, not theoretical, and because aircrews and ship crews need kit that evolves on operational timelines. A lean RCO focused on “fly it next quarter” answers that reality, turning the Navy’s acquisition culture from a committee of referees into a squad of engineers on the sideline, shoving the next tool into the fight.