Trump Calls Caribbean Cartels “Unlawful Combatants.” What That Means, And What Comes Next

The White House told Congress on October 1 that the United States is in a non-international armed conflict with drug cartels operating in the Caribbean, and that cartel members are “unlawful combatants.” The notice follows a string of lethal U.S. strikes on suspected drug boats near Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. The administration says this is about war powers and the law of armed conflict. Congress and rights groups are already pushing back.

 

“Unlawful Combatant” In Plain English

Under the Geneva Conventions, a non-international armed conflict is a fight between a state and one or more non-state armed groups. In such conflicts, the law of armed conflict still applies, but members of the non-state group do not enjoy the same privileges as lawful combatants in a traditional war between states.

Calling cartel fighters “unlawful combatants” is a legal signal that the U.S. views them as targetable fighters who lack prisoner-of-war protections if captured. That framing points to detention and targeting rules drawn from the laws of war rather than ordinary criminal law.

The administration’s memo pairs that status claim with recent force. At least three deadly strikes on suspected drug-running boats have been acknowledged in September, with reported fatalities of 17 or more. Human Rights Watch and others question whether the facts support an armed conflict classification and whether those killed were lawful military targets.

 

Is This An Undeclared War?

Short answer, it walks and talks like one, without a formal authorization. The White House says the “armed conflict” label is a legal explanation for actions under existing authorities. Critics in Congress call it executive overreach and are exploring legislation to fence it in, since no specific authorization for the use of military force against Caribbean cartels has passed. The legal fight will hinge on whether the facts rise to the threshold of armed conflict and whether existing statutes can bear this mission.

There is a related policy track that matters. Earlier this year, the administration created a process to designate international cartels as foreign terrorist organizations or as Specially Designated Global Terrorists. That tool expands sanctions and material support crimes, and it lays political groundwork for treating cartels as threats on par with terror groups, even before shots are fired.

 

What Forces Are Moving

This is not a paper exercise. U.S. Southern Command surged ships and aircraft into the southern Caribbean in late August and September. The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit left Norfolk in mid-August for operations tied to SOUTHCOM. Local reporting and naval press confirm the group’s presence and readiness for maritime interdiction, crisis response, and limited strike options.

The administration has acknowledged multiple kinetic actions at sea since September 2. A strike that day sank a suspected Venezuelan boat that President Trump said carried members of the Tren de Aragua gang. Two more strikes followed in mid-September. The Dominican Republic later recovered 377 packages of cocaine from a speedboat destroyed in a U.S. operation south of Isla Beata, and called it a historic first with the United States.

Coast Guard and joint task force pieces are in motion as well. Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West fuses intelligence and hands off targets to U.S. and partner assets. The Coast Guard has been surging cutters and air units, and recently recorded record offloads from Caribbean and Eastern Pacific seizures, a sign of capacity aligned behind this push.

Jose Aponte de la Torre Airport
Recent activity at Jose Aponte de la Torree Airport, in Ceiba, Puerto Rico. It is the site of the former Roosevelt Fields Naval Air Station.

Rules Of The Road If “Armed Conflict” Sticks

Labeling cartel members as unlawful combatants does not create a free fire zone. The law of armed conflict still requires distinction and proportionality, meaning the U.S. must target fighters and military objectives and avoid excessive collateral harm. If captured, detainees must be treated humanely under Common Article 3. The status claim does mean the U.S. can use military force against identified fighters even when they are not actively firing, a key difference from pure law enforcement. Don’t expect to see many detainees. Do expect debates over intelligence thresholds, targeting authority, and what counts as a direct part in hostilities for a smuggler on a fast boat.

What Preparations To Expect Next

Pentagon planners have been told to prepare military options against cartels and networks tied to designated terror groups. Look for a layered maritime screen that utilizes Navy and Coast Guard platforms, P-8 patrol aircraft, Marine aviation from the Iwo Jima group, and partner navies, such as the Dominican Navy, for evidence recovery and arrests. The pattern will look like counterpiracy or counterterrorism at sea, with more lethal authorities. Congress is signaling that it wants guardrails, so oversight and reporting fights are likely to come fast.

 

Bottom Line

The administration has crossed a legal and political Rubicon by calling this an armed conflict and tagging cartel operatives as unlawful combatants. Ships are already on station, strikes have already happened, and partner nations are now part of the evidence chain. Whether this becomes a sustained maritime campaign or is halted by courts and Congress depends on proof of who is being targeted and why, and on a legal basis that the White House can defend in public.

For now, the Caribbean is an active theater.

Right now, the lawyers are in one fight, and the sailors and Marines are in another.